

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES

JULY 11, 1957

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III

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

THURSDAY, JULY 11, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a. m., in room 457, Senate Office Building, Senator Roman L. Hruska presiding.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, associate counsel, Benjamin Mandel, research director, and F. W. Schroeder, chief investigator.

Senator HRUSKA. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Hruska, this morning we have four witnesses who will testify as to the meaning of the recent changes in the Soviet Union.

It is the duty of this committee to inform the Senate about the nature of the Communist organization and to inform the Senate on the developments that have taken place so that we might know as much as possible about the nature of this organization.

Now, since our last meeting, Senator, there has been an indictment handed down against two American citizens for espionage. Since this deals directly with this subject, I would like to introduce into the record the indictment.

Senator HRUSKA. It will be received and made a part of the record at this point.

(The indictment referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 481" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 481

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

United States of America v. George Zlatovski, also known as "George Michael," also known as "Rector," and Jane Foster Zlatovski, also known as "Slang," Defendants

INDICTMENT

The Grand Jury charges:

COUNT ONE

1. That from in or about January 1940 and continuously thereafter up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, in the Southern District of New York; in Washington, D. C.; in Paris, France; in Geneva, Zurich, and Lausanne, Switzerland; in Vienna, Salzburg, and Bad Gastein, Austria; in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and elsewhere, George Zlatovski, also known as "George Michael," also known as "Rector," and Jane Foster Zlatovski, also known as "Slang," the defendants herein, unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly did conspire and agree with each other and with Jack Soble,

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Myra Soble, Jacob Albam, Petr Vassilievich Fedotov, Alexander Mikhailovich Korotkov, Vassili M. Zubilin, also known as "Edward Herbert," Elizabeth Zubilin, also known as "Lisa," Mikhail Chaliapin, Stepan N. Choudenko, also known as "The Professor," Anatole B. Gromov, Leonid Dmitrievich Petrov, Vitaly Genadievich Tcherniawski, Afanasi Ivanovitch Yefimov, Christopher Georgievich Petrosian, Igor Vassilievitch Sokolov, Vladimir Alexandrovich, also known as "Volodia," whose full and complete name is otherwise unknown to the Grand Jury, and Vassili Mikhailovich Molev, coconspirators but not defendants herein, and with divers other persons to the Grand Jury unknown, to violate subsection (a) of Section 794, Title 18, United States Code, in that they did unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly conspire and agree to communicate, deliver, and transmit to a foreign government, to wit, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and representatives and agents thereof, directly and indirectly, documents, writings, photographs, notes and information relating to the national defense of the United States of America and particularly information relating to intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the United States Government, and relating to the personnel, arms and equipment of the United States armed forces, with intent and reason to believe that the said documents, writings, photographs, photographic negatives, notes, and information would be used to the advantage of a foreign nation, to wit, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

2. It was a part of said conspiracy that the defendants and their coconspirators would collect and obtain, and attempt to collect and obtain and would aid and induce divers other persons to the Grand Jury unknown, to collect and obtain information relating to the national defense of the United States of America, with intent and reason to believe that the said information would be used to the advantage of the said foreign nation, to wit, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

3. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and certain of the coconspirators, including Jack Soble, Myra Soble, Jacob Albam, Petr Vassilievich Fedotov, Alexander Mikhailovich Korotkov, Leonid Dmitrievich Petrov, Vitaly Genadievich Tcherniawski, Afanasi Ivanovitch Yefimov, Christopher Georgievich Petrosian, Igor Vassilievitch Sokolov, Vladimir Alexandrovich, also known as "Volodia," whose full and complete name is otherwise unknown to the Grand Jury, Vassili M. Zubilin, also known as "Edward Herbert," Elizabeth Zubilin, also known as "Lisa," Mikhail Chaliapin, Stepan N. Choudenko, also known as "the Professor," Anatole B. Gromov, and Vassili Mikhailovich Molev, being representatives, agents and employees of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, would by personal contact, communications, and other means to the Grand Jury unknown, both directly and indirectly, employ, supervise, pay and maintain the defendants and other coconspirators for the purpose of communicating, delivering and transmitting information relating to the national defense of the United States to said Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

4. It was further a part of said conspiracy that certain of the defendants and certain of their coconspirators would be employed by the Government of the United States in various capacities and activities in the United States, in France, in Germany, in Austria, and in other places to the Grand Jury unknown, for the purpose of being in a position to acquire information relating to the national defense of the United States, and would communicate, deliver and transmit, and attempt to communicate, deliver and transmit, and would aid and induce each other and divers other persons to the Grand Jury unknown, to communicate, deliver and transmit information relating to the national defense of the United States to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

5. It was further a part of said conspiracy that said defendants and their coconspirators would use false and fictitious names, coded communications, and other and further means to the Grand Jury unknown, to conceal the existence and purpose of said conspiracy.

In pursuance and furtherance of said conspiracy and to effect the object thereof, the defendants and their coconspirators did commit, among others, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, the following:

OVERT ACTS

1. In or about 1940, in Moscow in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein, had a conversation with Lavrenti Beria, the Peoples' Commissar of Internal Affairs in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

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and with Petr Vassilievich Fedotov, and others coconspirators herein, during which it was agreed that Jack Soble should depart from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and execute assignments in the Soviet intelligence service.

2. On or about October 20, 1941, Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein, entered the United States of America.

3. In or about the month of August 1942, in the Southern District of New York, Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein, did meet with Vassili M. Zubilin, a coconspirator herein, at the Paris Hotel at 97th Street and West End Avenue, New York City.

4. In the fall of 1942, in the Southern District of New York, Vassili M. Zubilin, a coconspirator herein introduced Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein, to Mikhail A. Chaliapin, a coconspirator herein.

5. In or about the month of March 1944, in the Southern District of New York, Elizabeth Zubilin, a coconspirator herein, telephoned one Boris Morros in Hollywood, California, instructing said Morros to come to New York City.

6. In or about the month of March 1944, in the Southern District of New York, Vassili M. Zubilin and Jack Soble, coconspirators herein, had a conversation with Boris Morros in the Far East Restaurant located in the vicinity of Eighth Avenue and 59th Street, New York City, during which Zubilin informed Morros that Morros would thereafter receive instructions from Soble.

7. In or about 1944, in the Southern District of New York Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein, did meet with one Stepan N. Choundenko, a coconspirator herein.

8. In or about the summer of 1945, in the Southern District of New York, Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein, did meet and have a conversation with Anatole B. Gromov, a coconspirator herein, at which time said Gromov directed Jack Soble to meet him in Washington, D. C.

9. In or about the month of December 1945, in the Southern District of New York, Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein, met Jane Foster Zlatovski a defendant herein, at the Majestic Apartments, located on Central Park West, New York City.

10. In or about the month of December 1945, in the Southern District of New York, the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski did meet with Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein, and did deliver to Jack Soble for transmittal to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics a report on Indonesia based upon information obtained by her while she was in the employ of the Office of Strategic Services of the United States of America.

11. In or about the month of September 1947, in Paris, France, the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski did meet Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein.

12. In or about the month of October 1947 the defendants Jane Foster Zlatovski and George Zlatovski did travel from Paris, France, to Vienna, Austria.

13. In or about the month of October 1947, in Vienna, Austria, the defendants Jane Foster Zlatovski and George Zlatovski met with a representative of the intelligence service of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the said Jane Foster Zlatovski at that time being an employee of the United States of America, and the said George Zlatovski at that time being an officer in the United States Army.

14. On or about March 25, 1948, the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski went to Paris, France, for the purpose of meeting with a representative of the intelligence service of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and transmitting to him information relating to the national defense of the United States of America, the said Jane Foster Zlatovski at that time being an employee of the United States of America.

15. On or about May 25, 1948, the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski went to Paris, France, for the purpose of meeting with a representative of the intelligence service of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and transmitting to him information relating to the national defense of the United States of America, the said Jane Foster Zlatovski at that time being an employee of the United States of America.

16. On or about July 25, 1948, the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski went to Paris, France, for the purpose of meeting with a representative of the intelligence service of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and transmitting to him information relating to the national defense of the United States of America, the said Jane Foster Zlatovski at that time being an employee of the United States of America.

17. On or about October 25, 1948, the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski went to Paris, France, for the purpose of meeting with a representative of the intelli-

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gence service of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and transmitting to him information relating to the national defense of the United States of America.

18. On or about February 25, 1949, the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski went to Paris, France, for the purpose of meeting with a representative of the intelligence service of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and transmitting to him information relating to the national defense of the United States of America.

19. In or about the month of June 1949, in Paris, France, the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski delivered to Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein, several sheets of paper with writing thereon comprising a report on a certain person employed in Paris, France, by the Economic Cooperation Administration of the United States of America.

20. In or about the month of June 1949, in Paris, France, the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski delivered to Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein, several sheets of paper with writing thereon, in which she reported that she had collected information concerning the personnel and operations of intelligence units of the United States of America, including biographical data on American intelligence agents.

21. On or about June 16, 1949, in Paris, France, Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein, did hand to Boris Morros the sheets of paper referred to in overt acts No. 19 and No. 20 and a separate document, with instructions to carry them to Vienna, Austria.

22. On or about July 6, 1949, in Vienna, Austria, Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein, did receive from the coconspirator Vitaly Genadievich Tcherniawski an envelope containing United States currency.

23. On or about July 7, 1949, in Zurich, Switzerland, Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein, and Boris Morros had a conversation during which Jack Soble said he intended to pay approximately \$1,100 to the defendants George Zlatovski and Jane Foster Zlatovski.

24. In or about 1949, in the Southern District of New York, Myra Soble, a coconspirator herein, had a conversation with the defendant George Zlatovski.

25. In or about 1949, the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski, at the instruction of Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein, did send money to the defendant George Zlatovski in the United States to enable him to travel to France.

26. During the period from in or about the month of December 1949 to in or about the month of October 1950, Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein, paid to the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski sums of money at approximately monthly intervals, which money came from representatives and agents of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

27. During the period from in or about the month of December 1949 to in or about the month of October 1950, Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein, paid to the defendant George Zlatovski sums of money at approximately monthly intervals, which money came from representatives and agents of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

28. During the period from in or about the month of December 1949 to in or about the month of October 1950, the defendant George Zlatovski, in Vienna, Austria, obtained and furnished to Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein, for transmittal to the intelligence service of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, information regarding a certain processing organization for refugees from countries in the Soviet bloc, including the names of certain persons who had fled to Austria from said countries.

29. In or about the month of December 1949 the defendants Jane Foster Zlatovski and George Zlatovski did, pursuant to instructions from Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein, travel to Austria to obtain compromising information regarding the personal lives, specifically, the "sexual and drinking habits," of the personnel assigned and attached to American installations in Austria.

30. On or about February 1, 1950, Petr Vassilievich Fedotov, Alexander Milkailovich Korotkov, and Leonid Dmitrievich Petrov, coconspirators herein, did meet with Boris Morros in an apartment in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

31. In or about November 1950, Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein, instructed the defendant George Zlatovski to go to Yugoslavia to establish contacts there and determine conditions in Yugoslavia.

32. In or about December 1950 the defendant George Zlatovski furnished to Jack Soble, a coconspirator herein, a report on his observations in Yugoslavia.

33. In or about the spring of 1951 the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski did travel from Paris, France, to Zurich, Switzerland.

34. In or about the spring of 1951, in Zurich, Switzerland, the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski did meet two representatives of the Union of Soviet

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Socialist Republics and did deliver a piece of paper with writing thereon to one of the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

35. In or about the month of June 1951, in Vienna, Austria, the defendant George Zlatovski handed to Boris Morros several sheets of paper in writing thereon in the English language, bearing at the top of the first page thereof the names "Rector" and "Slang," the code names for the defendants George Zlatovski and Jane Foster Zlatovski.

36. In or about the month of June 1951, in Vienna, Austria, the defendant George Zlatovski did hand to Boris Morros for delivery to representatives of the intelligence service of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics several sheets of paper with writing thereon in the Russian language.

37. On or about September 22, 1954, in Paris, France, the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski did write and hand to Boris Morros a one-page report addressed to "A. M." a representative of the intelligence service of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which report was signed with the code name "Slang."

38. In or about the month of March 1955, in the Southern District of New York, the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski met one Boris Morros.

(In violation of Section 794(c), Title 18, U. S. C.)

COUNT TWO

The Grand Jury further charges:

1. That from in or about January 1940 and continuously thereafter up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, in the Southern District of New York; in Washington, D. C.; in Vienna, Salzburg and Bad Gastein, Austria; in Paris, France; in Lausanne, Zurich, and Geneva, Switzerland; in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and elsewhere, George Zlatovski, also known as "George Michael," also known as "Rector," and Jane Foster Zlatovski, also known as "Slang," the defendants herein, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did conspire and agree together, and with each other, and with Jack Soble, Myra Soble, Jacob Albam, Petr Vassilievich Fedotov, Alexander Mikhailovich Korotkov, Vassili M. Zubilin, also known as "Edward Herbert," Elizabeth Zubilin, also known as "Liza," Mikhail Chaliapin, Stepan N. Chounenko, also known as "The Professor," Anatole B. Gromov, Leonid Dmitrievich Petrov, Vitaly Genadieievich Tcherniawski, Afanasi Ivanovitch Yefimov, Christopher Georgievich Petrosian, Igor Vassilievitch Sokolov, Vladimir Alexandrovich, also known as "Volodia," whose full and true name is otherwise unknown to the Grand Jury, and Vassili Mikhailovich Molev, coconspirators but not defendants herein, and with divers other persons to the Grand Jury unknown, to violate Subsection (c) of Section 793, Title 18, United States Code, in the manner and by the means hereinafter set forth.

2. It was a part of said conspiracy that the defendants and their coconspirators would, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense of the United States of America, receive and obtain and attempt to receive and obtain documents, writings, photographs, photographic negatives and notes of things connected with the national defense of the United States, knowing and having reason to believe at the time of said agreement to receive and obtain said documents, writings, photographs, photographic negatives and notes of things connected with the national defense, that said material would be obtained, taken, made, and disposed of contrary to the provisions of Chapter 37, Title 18, United States Code, in that they would be delivered and transmitted, directly and indirectly, to a foreign government, to wit, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, and to representatives, officers, agents and employees of the said Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the said defendants intending and having reason to believe that the said documents, writings, photographs, photographic negatives and notes of things relating to the national defense of the United States of America, would be used to the advantage of a foreign nation, to wit, the said Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

3. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the said defendants and their coconspirators would make contact with persons to the Grand Jury unknown, who were resident in the United States, in France, in Germany, in Austria, and at places to the Grand Jury unknown, and who, by reason of their employment, position or otherwise, were acquainted and familiar with and were in possession of or had access to information relating to the national defense of the United States of America.

4. It was further a part of said conspiracy that certain of the defendants and certain of their coconspirators would be employed by the Government of the

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United States in various capacities and activities in the United States, in France, in Germany, in Austria, and in other places to the Grand Jury unknown, for the purpose of being in a position to acquire information relating to the national defense of the United States, and would communicate, deliver and transmit, and attempt to communicate, deliver and transmit, and would aid and induce each other and divers other persons to the Grand Jury unknown, to communicate, deliver, and transmit information relating to the national defense of the United States to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

5. It was further a part of said conspiracy that said defendants and their co-conspirators would use false and fictitious names, coded communications, and other and further means to the Grand Jury unknown, to conceal the existence and purpose of said conspiracy.

OVERT ACTS

In pursuance and furtherance of said conspiracy and to effect the object thereof, the defendants and their coconspirators did commit, among others, within the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, the overt acts as alleged and set forth under Count I of this indictment, all of which overt acts are hereby realleged by the Grand Jury.

(Section 793, Title 18, United States Code.)

COUNT THREE

The Grand Jury further charges:

1. That throughout the entire period from in or about January 1940 and up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, through its representatives, agents, and employees, maintained within the United States and other parts of the world, a system and organization for the purpose of obtaining, collecting and receiving information and material from the United States of a military, commercial, industrial and political nature, and in connection therewith, recruited, induced, engaged and maintained the defendants and coconspirators hereinafter named and divers other persons to the Grand Jurors unknown, as agents, representatives and employees to obtain, collect and receive such information and material for the said government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

2. That from in or about January 1940 and continuously thereafter up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, in the Southern District of New York; in Washington, D. C., in Paris, France; in Geneva, Zurich and Lausanne, Switzerland; in Vienna, Salzburg, and Bad Gastein, Austria; in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and elsewhere, George Zlatovski, also known as "George Michael," also known as "Rector," and Jane Foster Zlatovski, also known as "Slang," the defendants herein, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did conspire and agree together, and with each other, and with the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and with agents, officers and employees of the said government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, including Jack Soble, Myra Soble, Jacob Albam, Petr Vassilievich Fedotov, Alexander Mihailovich Korotkov, Leonid Dmitrievich Petrov, Vitaly Genadie-vich Tcherniawski, Afanasi Ivanovitch Yefimov, Vassili M. Zublin, also known as "Edward Herbert," Elizabeth Zublin, also known as "Lisa," Mikhail Chalia-pin, Stepan M. Choudenko, also known as "The Professor," Anatole B. Gromov, Christopher Georgievich Petrosian, Igor Vassilievitch Sokolov, Vladimir Alex- androvich, also known as "Volodia," whose full and true name is otherwise unknown to the Grand Jury, and Vassili Mikhailovich Molev, coconspirators but not defendants herein, and divers other persons to the Grand Jury unknown, to commit an offense against the United States of America, to wit, to violate Section 951 of Title 18, United States Code, in the manner and by the means hereinafter set forth.

3. It was a part of said conspiracy that the defendants and certain of the coconspirators, none of whom was included among the accredited diplomatic or consular officers or attachés of the said government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or of any foreign government, would, within the United States, and without prior notification to the Secretary of State, act as agents of the said government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and would, as such agents, obtain, collect and receive information and material of a military, com-mercial, industrial and political nature, and as such agents would communicate and deliver said information and material to other coconspirators for transmis-

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sion to the said government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It was a part of said conspiracy that the other coconspirators residing outside the United States would direct, aid and assist the defendants aforesaid to act as such agents within the United States and would receive and transmit the said information and material to the said government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

4. It was further a part of the said conspiracy that the said government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its officers, agents and employees would employ, supervise and maintain the defendants within the United States as such agents of the said government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the purpose of obtaining, collecting, receiving, transmitting and communicating information and material of a military, commercial, industrial and political nature.

5. It was further a part of the said conspiracy that the defendants would receive sums of money and other valuable considerations from the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, its officers, agents and employees in return for acting as said agents of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics within the United States for the purpose of obtaining, collecting, receiving, transmitting and communicating information, material, messages and instructions on behalf of and for the use and advantage of the said government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

6. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the said defendants would use false and fictitious names, coded communications, and would resort to other means to the Grand Jury unknown to conceal the existence and purpose of said conspiracy.

OVERT ACTS

In pursuance and furtherance of said conspiracy and to effect the object thereof, the defendants and their coconspirators did commit, among others, within the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, the overt acts as alleged and set forth under Count I of this indictment, all of which overt acts are hereby realleged by the Grand Jury.

(In violation of Section 371, Title 18, United States Code.)

COUNT FOUR

The Grand Jury further charges:

That in or about the month of December 1945, within the Southern District of New York, the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski, also known as "Slang," unlawfully, knowingly and wilfully did then and there act as an agent of a foreign government, to wit, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, without prior notification to the Secretary of State of the United States of America, in that the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski did, for and on behalf of and at the request of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, its officers, agents and employees, write and deliver to Jack Soble, a coconspirator but not a defendant herein, for transmission to the said Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a written report on Indonesia which report was based upon information obtained by said defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski in the course of her employment with the Office of Strategic Services of the United States of America, the defendant then and there not being a diplomatic or consular official or attaché.

The defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski fled from justice in or about the month of April 1947 and departed from the United States of America and remained continuously outside of the United States of America until on and after September 1, 1954, the date of the enactment of c. 1214, Section 10 (a), 68 Stat. 1145.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 951.)

COUNT FIVE

The Grand Jury further charges:

1. At all times from about June 28, 1942, and up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, Jane Foster Zlatovski, also known as "Slang," the defendant herein, has been a person as defined in Title 22, United States Code, Sections 611, et seq. (known as the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended), hereinafter referred to as "the Act."

2. At all times from about June 28, 1942, and up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist

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Republics including its Government-controlled instrumentalities, agents, and affiliates, has been a foreign principal as defined in the Act.

3. During the period from about June 28, 1942, to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski, also known as "Slang," has acted within the United States and within the Southern District of New York as an agent of a foreign principal as defined in the Act because, within the United States and within the Southern District of New York, she has reported information to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, including its Government-controlled instrumentalities, agents and affiliates; and within the Southern District of New York, she has acted at the order, request, and direction of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, including its Government-Controlled instrumentalities, agents and affiliates.

4. By reason of which acts, the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski, also known as "Slang," has during the aforesaid period acted within the United States and within the Southern District of New York as an agent of a foreign principal, and has therefore been under the duty to file a true and complete registration statement as required by Section 612 of the Act.

5. From on or about January 28, 1942, and at various times thereafter up to the date of the filing of this indictment, the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski, also known as "Slang," has unlawfully and wilfully acted as an agent of a foreign principal within the Southern District of New York without having filed with the Attorney General of the United States the registration statement required by the Act.

6. By reason of the nature of her activities and her relationship with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, including its Government-controlled instrumentalities, agents, and affiliates, the defendant Jane Foster Zlatovski, also known as "Slang," does not fall within the purview of any of the exemptions from registration provided by the Act.

(Title 22, United States Code, Sections 612, 618.)

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to put into the record at this point the statement of yours, Senator Hruska, on the significance of this, particularly in connection with your statement where you say that "the folly of the present campaign against security safeguards in our Government" was brought out by the fact that the State Department wanted to deny a passport to Mrs. Zlatovski and was not able to do so.

Senator HRUSKA. It will be received.

(The statement of Senator Hruska referred to is as follows:)

JULY 10, 1957.

The disclosure that Jane Foster Zlatovski, recently indicted in New York as a Soviet spy, was issued a passport by the State Department 2 years ago, after its objections were deemed inadequate by Federal District Court Judge Burnita Matthews, points out the folly of the present campaign against security safeguards in our Government.

I have verified the story and it is a sound instance of the contention that the Secretary of State should have some discretion in denying a passport to a suspect without having to put all the evidence and information supporting his decisions into the public record.

In the case of Mrs. Zlatovski, the Secretary of State was forced to choose between producing his evidence or issuing a passport. He could not prejudge the security involved in the surveillance then going on and had no alternative but to grant the passport.

As a consequence a Communist suspect who has been indicted for espionage was able to move about in Europe for 2 additional years on an American passport and is now outside the jurisdiction of the United States. The passport of George Zlatovski was not renewed by the Department of State after 1954.

I hope that the French Government will extradite the Zlatovskis and that there will be an early trial so that the details of current Soviet espionage can be known to the American people.

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Mr. MORRIS. And also, there has been one other development, Senator Hruska. I would like to introduce into the record at this point a clipping from the New York Times of July 7, 1957, stating:

The United States has ousted a member of the Communist Hungarian mission to the United Nations on grounds that he exceeded the limits of his diplomatic privileges in this country.

Senator HRUSKA. That will also be made a part of the record. (The clipping referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 482" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 482

[New York Times, July 7, 1957, p. 601]

UNITED STATES OUSTS HUNGARIAN

CHARGES MEMBER OF MISSION TO U. N. EXCEEDED PRIVILEGE

WASHINGTON, July 6 (AP).—The United States has ousted a member of the Communist Hungarian missions to the United Nations on grounds that he exceeded the limits of his diplomatic privileges in this country.

Officials said today that the diplomat, who left the country more than a week ago, was Pal Racz, Second Secretary of the Hungarian mission at United Nations headquarters in New York.

The State Department acted against the Hungarian on the reported charge that he was collecting information he had no right to collect.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bialer, will you come forward, please?

Senator, since Mr. Bialer's last appearance before this committee his English has improved considerably. Now, Prof. Jan Karski, who has interpreted for him in the past, is also present. I believe we can proceed without the assistance of Mr. Karski.

Senator HRUSKA. Very well, that will testify well for his doing his homework, I am sure.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, because of the time element involved here, I suggest that we take the witnesses who will testify and Mr. Karski and that we swear them now at the beginning.

Senator HRUSKA. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Ege and Mr. Klimov, will you gentlemen also come forward, please? Just come forward and be sworn.

Senator HRUSKA. The witnesses will raise their hands and be sworn.

Do you and each of you solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about to give be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BIALER. I do.

Mr. EGE. I do.

Mr. KLIMOV. I do.

Senator HRUSKA. I will also swear the interpreter.

(Thereupon, Mr. Jan Karski was duly sworn to act as interpreter by Senator Hruska.)

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Senator, Mr. Bialer in one way is a firsthand witness to these events. He has read the minutes of the July 1955 meeting at which he, according to his statements to us this morning, indicates this struggle began.

(The biographical material relating to Mr. Bialer, referred to here-

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inafter, was marked "Exhibit No. 483" and is as follows:)

(EXHIBIT No. 483, SEWERYN BIALEK)

Native of Poland. Born November 3, 1926. In 1942 joined underground anti-Nazi Communist organization at Lodz. From July 1944 to May 1945, was inmate of Auschwitz and Friedland concentration camps.

After his release Bialer was employed, until 1951, in various political positions with the Polish militia and was chief of the Political Division of the Headquarters of the Polish Militia when he was assigned to the Polish Communist Party.

As an official of the Communist Party, Bialer was employed by the Central Committee as one of the chiefs of anti-Western and anti-American propaganda. In that work, he lectured for the Central Committee, was First Secretary to two important Communist schools, ideological adviser to the Peoples Tribune, a leading Communist paper; contributor to other newspapers; a professor of the Institute of Social Sciences at the Central Committee and researcher in the Institute of Economic Sciences of the Polish Academy of Science.

He carried on his propaganda work also by public lectures, by writing instructions to party workers and through conferences with persons from other Communist countries.

In the middle of January 1956, Bialer was sent to East Berlin as a member of the official Polish delegation. On January 31 he crossed the border into West Berlin and, May 4, 1956, came to the United States, where one of his first occupations was the preparation of a psychological warfare memorandum for the Free Europe Committee.

He testified first for the subcommittee on June 8, 1956.

**TESTIMONY OF SEWERYN BIALER, ACCCOMPANIED BY
INTERPRETER**

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder, Mr. Bialer, if you will tell us when the struggle which was climaxed by the removal from power of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich had its origin?

Mr. BIALER. I speak about the post-Stalin period, after Stalin's death: The struggle between Malenkov and Khrushchev began, really, in 1953, and in 1954 we can see clearly the struggle between the two men.

The struggle between Khrushchev and the Molotov group began in 1954, after the dismissal of Malenkov.

I will first speak about the struggle between Malenkov and Khrushchev.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I might point out that Mr. Bialer made a point that two issues are involved. One is the struggle by Khrushchev against Malenkov, and one is the struggle by Khrushchev against Molotov. There are two issues here, as I understand it.

Mr. BIALER. The struggle between Khrushchev and Malenkov at this time after Stalin's death concerned two problems. The first problem was the internal problem. The second, to us, was the foreign relations the Soviet Union had with the free world. In these two matters Malenkov had a different point of view than Khrushchev. When it concerned the inner-Soviet matters, Malenkov represented the State apparatus, represented the technicians groups, and Khrushchev represented the second apparatus of power in the Soviet Union, the party apparatus.

And the struggle between these two men is the struggle of the forms of organization in the Soviet Union. It was the struggle of the organization of the industry; it was a struggle about the problem of the agriculture policy.

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Now, I think it's more important, the problem of the foreign policy. In the American newspaper I have not seen much written about this problem.

The problem is, I believe, that Malenkov has another conception of foreign policy than Khrushchev. The Malenkov policy, the conception of Malenkov's foreign policy was not a conception of a Soviet offensive against the free world.

We can see this on the one hand from what Malenkov did not say in his speech, and on the other, we can see this from what Malenkov has said in his speeches.

I can remember, for example, his explanation on the atomic war. He was the first man in the Soviet Union to have said that the atomic war can bring an end to the whole civilization.

Mr. MORRIS. This is Malenkov?

Mr. BIALER. This is Malenkov.

And Khrushchev denied this and said that the atomic war can bring on the end of the Western offensive, not the Communists'.

Malenkov had a real conception when we speak about foreign policy—had a conception of not offensive policy, a policy of rest. He must have time for inner-Soviet matters, and he wanted to ease the foreign relations with the free world.

This was the most important thing, I think, about the struggle between Khrushchev and Malenkov during this period.

Mr. MORRIS. So that Mr. Malenkov is the one who represented moderation?

Mr. BIALER. I think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Practically speaking, anyway.

Mr. BIALER. I can give you one example.

In 1955, in February, when Malenkov was dismissed from the post of Prime Minister, there was a secret letter from the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party in which it was explained why Malenkov must be dismissed. It was not the official reason that was in the newspapers, that is, Pravda, and others. It was an explanation that Malenkov's policy could bring difficulties with the satellite countries.

And I wish to remind you at this same time when Malenkov was dismissed, Imre Nagy was dismissed also by Rakosi in Hungary. It was not accidental. In many problems in internal policy, Malenkov agreed with Nagy's views.

In the fight between Khrushchev and Malenkov, Molotov was on the side of Khrushchev. It was an alliance between Molotov and Khrushchev.

Mr. MORRIS. May I just ask, so this is clear, Mr. Bialer? You have now told us that Malenkov and Khrushchev had differences in the days when you used to read about them in the meetings, and Malenkov represented moderation?

Mr. BIALER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, at the same time there has been another struggle. You are saying at this point that Molotov in this struggle sided with Khrushchev?

Mr. BIALER. You see, Khrushchev has this same tactic as Stalin; he didn't fight with two groups at the same time. When he fought with Malenkov in 1954 and the beginning of 1955, he didn't fight with Molotov. Molotov was in this time his ally.

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And we can ask the question why Molotov was allied with Khrushchev at this time. The explanation is: because Molotov is at all times a Stalinist, a very conservative Stalinist, and the Khrushchev policy was, for him, moderate, but much more Stalinist than the policies of Malenkov. The policies of Malenkov were for him more alien [objectionable] than the policies of Khrushchev. And from this point of view, Khrushchev and Molotov can at this time go together.

And Molotov fought with Malenkov. You can read his speech in the February session of the Supreme Soviet, where he denounced Malenkov's policy, and he fought with Malenkov.

But 3 weeks later, after the dismissal of Malenkov, the fight between Khrushchev and Molotov began. Khrushchev didn't need Molotov to fight against Malenkov because Malenkov is dismissed. And the fight with Molotov began in a session of the Soviet Politburo, in—I think it was the second half of March of 1955—when Khrushchev was talking about Tito, about the relations with Yugoslavia and about Austria, and Molotov was in opposition to Khrushchev's point of view. He didn't want agreement with Tito and he didn't want a treaty with Austria.

The fight lasted through July 1955. In July 1955 there was a meeting of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Part of this meeting was published in the papers. The second half was secret.

Mr. MORRIS. You have read it, have you?

Mr. BIALER. I read the whole minutes of it.

Mr. MORRIS. The importance of Mr. Bialer's appearance here—he was privy to these secrets because he was an official of the Communist Party in Poland, and he read those minutes which we do not know about.

Mr. BIALER. In July 1955, when this meeting of the central committee of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union took place, it was the end of one section of the struggle between Molotov and Khrushchev. Two resolutions were brought to the session. One resolution was by Molotov. It was a resolution against agreement with Tito, against softening the policy. The second was by Khrushchev. And Molotov was, at this session of the central committee, completely defeated. His resolution had not one vote in the central committee.

And then he remained alone against the Khrushchev resolutions. And the end of this meeting, Khrushchev, with very strong words, spoke against Molotov.

Mr. MORRIS. What did he say?

Mr. BIALER. I must remember exactly the words, they were very strong words. They were words to the effect that if he will go forward with his policy, with his thinking, it will bring a bad end to him.

Mr. MORRIS. This is July 1955?

Mr. BIALER. This was July 1955. He spoke about his [Molotov's] wife, I remember, that his wife exercised a very big influence on him and this will have a bad ending if he will not change.

Senator HRUSKA. Whose wife was he talking about?

Mr. BIALER. Molotov's wife.

Senator HRUSKA. Now, what particular meaning—

Mr. BIALER. I can remember what we are told in the central committee of the Polish Communist Party. We have seen from these

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words that this is not only political struggle, this is also a personal struggle. We see that there are personal differences, personal enmities, between Molotov and Khrushchev. And his words about Molotov's wife was "his evil spirit, she exercises an evil power." I remember the words: "It's not necessary for him," said Khrushchev to Molotov—"it's not necessary for him to go to hang at her apron strings."

Mr. MORRIS. Molotov's wife was not just a housewife, she was an important Communist official?

Mr. BIALER. I think so.

When I was here 1 year ago, I spoke about this, that I think that the end of Molotov, of political power of Molotov, was coming not in 1956 when he was dismissed from the office of the Foreign Minister, but in July 1955 when he was isolated in the central committee of the party and had not one vote.

And we can ask a question. The question is: What happened between July 1955 and July 1956?

In July 1956, Molotov was dismissed from the office of Foreign Minister. And what happened between this time and the time 3 months later, in September 1956, when Molotov—we can see—had risen to power. When he went with Khrushchev and Mikoyan and Bulganin to Poland to exercise influence on the Polish central committee not to choose Gomulka for its secretary.

What happened between this time and months ago when, we know now, that in the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party, Molotov has strengths so he can fight with Khrushchev?

One thing happened during this time. There was the Poznan uprising, the Hungarian revolution, the bloodless revolution in Poland, the confusion of the Communist movement abroad.

And this problem was to bring back Molotov power; bring back to him his followers in the Communist Party in the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, these were all setbacks for the Khrushchev policy and Molotov gained some stature?

Mr. BIALER. Yes. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what about the Kaganovich purge? How does he fit in?

Mr. BIALER. What?

Mr. MORRIS. What about the Kaganovich purge?

Mr. BIALER. I think we can manage to get Kaganovich and Molotov in one bundle, in one group.

But we must ask another question. How is it that Molotov fought against Malenkov in 1954, 1955? Molotov was at all times Stalinist, very conservative Stalinist, as was Kaganovich.

And Malenkov from the years 1953, 1954, after Stalin's death, was the follower of a more moderate policy than Khrushchev was in foreign relations.

How can this be, that Molotov and Kaganovich and Malenkov are now in one group against Khrushchev?

I think that this is the same kind of tactical alliance as in 1954. In 1954 Khrushchev and Molotov differed in many ways, but Khrushchev and Molotov, independent of the differences between them, were both against Malenkov. And they fought Malenkov.

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We see in 1957 that Malenkov, although in disagreement with Molotov and Kaganovich on many issues, has a tactical alliance with them and they fought together against Khrushchev now.

The easiest targets for Khrushchev are Molotov and Kaganovich. Kaganovich and Molotov were at all times Stalinist, and Stalinism is unpopular in Russia, and it's very unpopular in the foreign Communist countries. Khrushchev did not fear Molotov and Kaganovich so much as he feared Malenkov.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, the issue here, in your opinion, the heart of the issue is that the relative moderation that Malenkov represented was feared by Khrushchev, and that Khrushchev made this move against Malenkov and covered it by purging at the same time two unpopular figures, Molotov and Kaganovich?

Mr. BIALER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Just briefly, what does this portend for the future?

Mr. BIALER. I don't think there will be big changes in Soviet foreign policy or Soviet internal policy. You see, Khrushchev was in power all the time from 1954, 1955, 1956, and he exercised his policy, his line, and he now has a free hand. He can exercise his policy now with more stability, with more power. But I don't think this will bring changes, because the policy throughout this time was Khrushchev's policy. There was only a short interval in his power. It was in 1956 when Molotov and Kaganovich had more to say, had more influence.

But I don't think there will be big changes. There may be tactical changes in Soviet policy now. There may be such changes, as Khrushchev needs time now to strengthen his power, to stabilize his power. He can go one step further with his same old policy. I don't think we can expect big changes in the Soviet policy.

Senator Hruska. Well, in that regard, were there any big differences between Malenkov and Khrushchev on the approach to disarmament?

Mr. BIALER. I think that Khrushchev represents a very offensive foreign policy. There is a big difference between his policy and the offensive policy of Stalin. Stalin's offensive policy was a policy of a many-front offensive including the war in Korea and the war in Vietnam. It was a policy, an offensive policy, with military means, with state means, and Government means.

When we speak about Khrushchev, I think his policy is an offensive policy. The main means, the most important means of his policy are the means of politics, the means of diplomacy, the means of diversion, of intrigue, and so on.

And I think it is true when he says that he is not a Stalinist, he's a Leninist. I will explain this. He is a Stalinist in the tactics of his fight.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Malenkov?

Mr. BIALER. When we speak about Malenkov, Malenkov was, in the first place, interested in the internal Soviet problems, and from the foreign relations he wanted rest, he wanted relaxation. He wanted to have possibilities to carry on his internal policy. In foreign relations, I think he was the only man in the Soviet Politburo that really wanted coexistence—I can't say forever—coexistence for a time, for 5 years, maybe for 10 years, for a time, to have time to carry out his internal policy.

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Senator HRUSKA. And would he want disarmament for that same reason, any kind of disarmament agreement for that same reason?

Mr. BIALER. I cannot say how far he would go in disarmament problems. I am sure he would go much farther than Khrushchev would go.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, because of the element of time—I mean this is all very interesting and important—I ask that Mr. Bialer be excused at this time. Maybe we can have a further session later on.

Will you stand by, Mr. Bialer?

Mr. BIALER. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I would like at this point to put in the record the Daily Worker of Tuesday, July 9, which endorses all these recent changes. I would like that to go in the record.

Senator HRUSKA. It will be accepted and placed in the record at this point.

(The article from the Daily Worker referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 484," and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 484

[Daily Worker, New York, Tuesday, July 9, 1957, p. 5]

SOVIET EVENTS AND COEXISTENCE

Whatever their many secondary elements, the central feature of the recent historic Soviet events is that they strengthen the tide to peaceful coexistence and a durable peace.

That is its supreme importance to the American people and the peoples of the world. No State Department speculation or malicious New York Times editorials can obscure that cardinal point.

Prime Minister Nehru, of India, spoke for the overwhelming majority of mankind when he said Thursday that the recent events would strengthen peaceful relations between the U. S. S. R. and other countries and thus the cause of world peace. He termed this "the psychological moment" for easing East-West tensions and for new progress in the current London disarmament talks.

On the basis of the material before us, it is apparent that the recent events were a culmination of a series of sharp policy debates over questions of internal Soviet policy and foreign affairs. In essence these questions were not new. In their main outline they had been debated during the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. What the recent meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU did was to reaffirm these policies in the sharpest way, take decisive steps against those who were resisting these policies by factional means and were, in fact, seeking to overturn the Congress decisions by a coup among the members of the CPSU Presidium.

The chief policy elements of the 20th Congress were the emphasis on the possibility of peaceful coexistence and the rejection of the theory of the inevitability of war; the various roads to socialism; the possibility of the transition to socialism by parliamentary means in various countries; the emphasis on the equality of socialist nations, the post-Stalin policy of internal democratization and internal reorganization based on the tremendous growth of the socialist economy.

The decisions of the 20th Congress were widely hailed, particularly among the socialist-minded and peace-loving peoples of the world. These decisions registered a new stage in the growth of socialism and the system of socialist states; and they further speeded the developments toward peaceful coexistence.

But it is now clear that there was considerable resistance to the application of these decisions. There were those, headed apparently by V. M. Molotov, who wanted to "tighten the screws" and thus objectively hampered the full unfolding of policies to strengthen peace. Clearly, this group also demanded policies which would have maintained old and harmful relations between the U. S. S. R. and Yugoslavia, for example.

The prompt manner in which the recent decisions were greeted in China, Poland, and Yugoslavia is some indication of the sensitivity of these peoples to the harmful policies of Molotov and his associates. This feeling was also re-

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flected by Italian Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti when he wrote in L'Unita July 7 that the CPSU shakeup "has knocked down the barriers * * * to the search for original roads to socialism," that it was a move furthering "a policy of relaxation of tension and peaceful coexistence" and that the reorganization "gave a serious blow to the forces of conservatism and dogmatism."

To American Marxists the theory of various roads to socialism is not a new one. Premised on the principles of scientific socialism, the teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and the experience of American labor, there has evolved the concept of the American road to socialism, based on the struggles of the American working class and its allies within the traditions, customs, and peculiarities of the American scene. This concept is now incorporated in the preamble to the Constitution of the Communist Party of the United States, as adopted by its 16th national convention.

We who fight for peace, democracy, and socialism in our own land can only view most sympathetically all those developments in the first land of socialism which strengthen the fight for peace and social progress. We view with the warmest sympathy the efforts of Soviet Communists to maintain inviolable the unity of the party which leads the 200 million Soviet peoples. We view with satisfaction—as undoubtedly do many other Americans who do not share our outlook—the rebuffing of a faction which opposed the steps to a new Geneva, to improved relations with all nations, to heighten the living standards and democratic rights of the Soviet peoples.

From all accounts the issues were debated vigorously for a week at a full meeting of the Central Committee (about 200 were present) with all points of view presented. This was a departure from certain of the condemned practices of the latter years of the Stalin leadership, which frequently bypassed the CPSU's elected bodies. The meeting took the decisive steps already noted. It may be suggested, however, that matters might not have even come to this pass had a wide public discussion preceded the meeting, for the Soviet Communist Party membership and the Soviet people undoubtedly support wholeheartedly the policies of peaceful coexistence, democratization, and the raising of living standards. The process of democratization requires such public debate: the process of correction of the abuses of Soviet democracy will undoubtedly provide new forms for such public discussion.

But this is distinctly subordinate to the historic events themselves—events which will help shape a peaceful world.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly given earnest of its profound desire for peace. As last week's events demonstrate dramatically it pursues firmly policies of peaceful coexistence, is seeking continuously to raise the standards of its own people and compete with other social systems not by war but in ideas, culture, and economic progress.

We Americans have a responsibility in this situation. In Nehru's phrase we have reached the "psychological moment" for a great new initiative for peace.

Is it not time for the American people to act politically against the belligerent policies of Dulles, Radford, and Knowland? Is it not high time for the people in increasing number to renew the demand for an end to A-bomb tests poisoning the world's atmosphere? Is it not time for the whole trade union movement to follow the example of labor leaders Walter Reuther, James Carey, and Joseph Beirne who recently joined 80 other noted Americans in demanding an end to the poison tests? And is it not necessary to equip our delegates in London with a firm popular mandate to proceed to a mutually acceptable disarmament agreement?

Many, many more things might—and will—be said about the recent Soviet events, but these, it strikes us, are the crucial ones today.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Ege, will you come forward, please?

Senator, in connection with Mr. Ege's testimony, I would like to offer for the record the statement that he gave in May of 1956 before the House Un-American Activities Committee. And you remember, Senator, it was written in May of 1956. Mr. Ege said:

It is also possible that, in the future, G. Malenkov, A. Mikoyan, and L. Kaganovich will be removed by Khrushchev as Stalin's accomplices. The field will then be left to Khrushchev, Voroshiloff, Zhukov, and Molotov, all of whom are Russians by national origin. The reason behind this thinking is that Malenkov and Mikoyan are, historically speaking, more responsible for Stalin's crimes than Khrushchev himself.

Now, on the basis of his forecasts at that time, we thought it would be important to have Mr. Ege here to give us his interpretation of these recent changes.

Senator Hruska. Will you proceed, please?

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I am sorry to break in again, but we have here a short biographical sketch of the witnesses this morning. Maybe we should insert these in the record preceding each witness' testimony.

Senator Hruska. They will go in the record at an appropriate place preceding their respective testimony.

(The biographical sketch of Mr. Ege was marked "Exhibit No. 485" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 485

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Ismail Ege, born in city of Orak in Ural district of Soviet Union. Name at birth was Ismail Gusseynovich Akhmedov, assumed name of Ege when came to the United States. Entered Red army in 1925, when he was sent by the central committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party to Leningrad to enter Leningrad School of Military Communications. In 1929 graduated with rank of lieutenant and appointed to field services in Caucasia—the Caucasian Red Banner Army—as an officer in 11th Radio Battalion. After few months was selected for intelligence service of Caucasian Army because of knowledge of Turkish, and some German. In September 1940, after graduating from war college of general staff of Red army, was appointed to intelligence department of Red army. At first was deputy chief for one of agents operations sections of intelligence department charged with getting data on technical devices of military significance in foreign armies, later became chief of section. In May 1941 was sent to Germany on intelligence mission under cover as vice president of Tass Bureau in Berlin, using false name and biographical information. War began in latter part of June 1941, and he was arrested by Gestapo and put in concentration camp for about a month. Ege was then returned to Soviet officials in prisoner exchange. He was appointed press attaché of Soviet Embassy in Turkey, where his duties were to renew agent operations against Germany. On June 3, 1942, defected from Soviet Union while serving in Istanbul.

TESTIMONY OF ISMAIL EGE

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what is the meaning of these changes, Mr. Ege?

Mr. Ege. Mr. Chairman, the latest changes in Moscow did not surprise me at all. It had to happen.

For the meaning of the late shakeup in the Kremlin, it is my personal opinion that the words I have written in the article for the Un-American Activities Committee of the Congress still stand today.

I have a few additions to this article under present conditions.

I think that the present shakeup in the Presidium of the Communist Party, Soviet Union, which removed Kaganovich and Molotov and some others, like Shepilov and Pirov, and maybe some others, was a culmination of this strife within the Communist Party of Soviet Union.

Further, I think that this trouble within the ruling clique of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is, primarily, a struggle on political issues. It does not mean that there was no struggle between personalities. But I think this was a struggle on political issues mainly.

I will not speak too much about personalities except Molotov.

I left the Soviet Union in 1941, when I was on the Army General Staff. I knew Molotov, Mikoyan, and Zarubin as the men who engi-

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neered Soviet aggression and Stalin's policies. That's the reason why I wrote in my previous article that Mikoyan may be expected to be removed. Obviously, Mikoyan was more shrewd and quickly shifted sides. But this does not grant that at some future time, Mikoyan and even Voroshiloff will not be removed from their present posts.

More than that, I do not think that this struggle within the Communist Party of Soviet Union is ended now. It has to be expected that the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government would remove shortly from their party and government posts party functionists and government officials of the lower echelons. And it might be that no changes would go down as far as Ambassador.

Mr. MORRIS. Ambassador and what?

Mr. EGE. To remove from Ambassador posts outside the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Ambassador Zarubin here in Washington? He was supposed to be closely associated with Stalin, was he not?

Mr. EGE. I do not know personally, but according to my past experience, Zarubin was associated with the policy of Stalin in older days, and especially when Agradoff, who is the Soviet Ambassador to Paris, was, with Zarubin and Beria, supporting Molotov in foreign policy.

When the Red Army entered the Soviet Union apparatus during the war, operating in Turkey and from other NATO countries, in order to defeat the Germans, Molotov always insisted that all these operations had to be directly reported, not to the central department of the Soviet Union, but to Malenkov and Molotov. He tried everything to shift this interest of military interests into political channels.

So I do think that, this struggle being not finished, they are going to remove these persons too.

Mr. MORRIS. Now in the case of Mr. Zarubin, if you think he is going to be removed from this post of Ambassador here and recalled—is that what, in effect, you are saying—would it serve any purpose, do you think, to offer him asylum before he is sent back?

Mr. EGE. I think so. Not only Zarubin. I think that if, in the lower echelons of the Soviet Government and the party stationed abroad, there are some persons who are connected with the policies of Stalin, and if they think that they were right and Khrushchev not right, why not invite the rest of them to the West and affect public opinion on the issue and prove that Khrushchev is not right—that they were right?

Mr. MORRIS. So you think the Americans should accept such a recommendation?

Mr. EGE. I don't know whether it is proper for agencies or Government officials of the United States to invite Zarubin to come to this side, but he personally, if he is going to be removed and called home, would do best if he'll stay here and put the issues before world opinion in order to show what happened really in the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. And, also, we could learn from men like that many of the details of Soviet espionage against the United States, which is of interest to the subcommittee?

Mr. EGE. Quite right.

Further, in connection with this shakeup, in the Western press there were many articles which mostly are wishful and speculating. And

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some people think that this shakeup in the Kremlin is a sign of weakness of the Soviet Union.

I do not agree personally with that kind of speculation. It would be an unpermissible luxury for the Government of the Soviet Union and for the president of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at times of weakness and emergency to remove such persons as Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov.

On the contrary, it shows that the Soviet Union now, on all available data in the press, especially in the Soviet press, is politically, economically, and militarily, very strong.

Now, for the West, of fundamental importance is the fact that in connection with this shakeup the structure of Soviet power has not changed radically. It is still Soviet power; it is still despotism. Only the strategy of the Communist Party is changed.

Instead of immediate war, I do think that the Soviets under Khrushchev, now don't want war, but they are going to compete in the economic and political fronts with the West. And that will be a difficult fight, and the West must not forget about this side of the struggle.

The will to make good the world goal of international communism, has not changed. And, as you remember, Khrushchev, when he appeared on television before the American Nation, said that goal is the same goal. And he went further. He said that many generations of Americans will become citizens of Socialist countries. That means that they did not change goals.

I hope that generations of Soviet countries will become citizens of democratic countries. But the West, especially United States of America, must remain vigilant and watchful.

And finally, I think it is appropriate to mention here, that one of the reasons of this shakeup in the Kremlin was due to firm American policy.

The United States of America, under the present administration, did everything in order to defend the freedoms, to organize NATO, SEATO, and to help other countries against Communist aggression.

And for the Soviets, it is realistically hard to evaluate all of this. They were forced to face this, and perhaps for a time to relax their policy in the direction of liberalization or relaxation of the international issues. But that does not mean that they will go forever on this issue.

And summing up this shakeup, I would like to characterize it as really a parasite movement, because Khruschev was quick enough to put himself at the head of a movement which, at least in the minor issues, is better than that of persons supporting Molotov and Kaganovich.

Senator Hruska. Well, to that extent do you think he played the role of opportunist?

Mr. Ege. Quite possible.

Senator Hruska. Do you think that that was more than he could handle so he ran ahead of the crowd?

Mr. Ege. That's right.

On the other hand, I don't think Khrushchev in person will make a second Stalin. The history of mankind shows that all dictatorships die or wither or reform with the death of dictators. I do think that the Soviet Union is not an exception to this rule of history.

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When Stalin died, Stalin's dictatorship was going to reform itself. The Soviet Government did not change radically, but there are some things which are very interesting. There are even remarkable things.

There was a book recently written in the Soviet Union which is called Not By Bread Alone. The title, as you see, is taken from the Bible. In Stalin's time, just for that type of title, a man would be sent to a concentration camp or just liquidated.

And this book talks openly about "drastovs"—Communist bureaucrats—and calls for something new.

Senator HRUSKA. Mr. Ege, last year you reported to the House Un-American Activities Committee that it is possible that in the future Malenkov and Mikoyan and Kaganovich would be removed.

Mr. EGE. Right.

Senator HRUSKA. You did not include Molotov in that.

Now, the fact that he was excluded, does that have any special meaning?

Mr. EGE. No. When I included, instead of Molotov, Mikoyan, I was thinking in the terms of my background experience in Soviet infiltration, subversion, and political operations. Mikoyan was helping Stalin in the same degree as Molotov. And the Office of Foreign Trade Commissariat or Foreign Trade Ministry, was one of the posts of Mikoyan. And Mikoyan did his best to help the Soviet, and his officers to get into this office, to be dispatched overseas, and, under the cover of the Foreign Trade Ministry, to continue on subversion, espionage, and infiltration. And Mikoyan was known for a long time as a personal friend of Stalin.

So I had—at least it seemed to me—reason to think that Mikoyan would be removed.

But Mikoyan is of Oriental origin. He is an Armenian. Perhaps he was more shrewd and, in time, quickly shifted sides. And, instead, Molotov was removed.

That does not guarantee, of course, that Mikoyan will stay forever.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Ege. We appreciate your testimony.

Mr. EGE. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, at this point may I have inserted in the record the statement of Yuri Rastvorov as sworn testimony on his part? He had previously been sworn.

Senator HRUSKA. Very well, it will be made a part of the record at this point.

(The biographical sketch of Yuri Rastvorov is as follows:)

YURI RASTVOROV

Began career as officer of the Soviet Intelligence Service, MVD, in 1940 with entry into Japanese department of the Moscow Institute of Eastern Studies. Study of Japanese language interrupted by outbreak of war between Germany and Soviet Union in June 1941. Rastvorov, together with all other students in Japanese department of Institute of Eastern Studies in Moscow, was ordered to proceed to Soviet Far East to be employed as interpreter, and as an officer of the psychological warfare service in the special Far East Red army. Soon after Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he was transferred from Mongolia to Fergana, the location to which the Institute of Eastern Studies has been evacuated from Moscow. In 1943 was recalled from the Institute and assigned to Japanese department of the Intelligence Directorate of Soviet Ministry of State Security. In January 1946, after appropriate intelligence operational training,

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he was sent to Tokyo under the guise of a representative of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Defected from Soviet Union in Tokyo in January 1954.

(His replies to questions by Counsel Morris, as previously recorded, are as follows:)

Mr. MORRIS. Do the recent changes in Moscow indicate any future change in Soviet foreign policy?

Mr. RASTVOROV. No. Internal struggles in the Communist hierarchy are a natural part of dictatorship, which bears within itself the seeds of such struggles in their most ruthless form. If we look back, we see that this is just another example of such a struggle, of which there have been many before. Regardless of internal tumult, the basic tenets of communism hold, and we can expect more such struggles, without any really basic change in domestic or foreign policy. It would be dangerous for the Western World to lower its guard, hoping that new faces in Moscow mean new policies abroad.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know about the so-called Leningrad affair?

Mr. RASTVOROV. In 1948 or 1949 a number of the party leaders in the Leningrad area simply disappeared. The rubberstamp explanation was that they were "enemies of the people." People in the Soviet Union have been disappearing without a trace for years, and the leaders have never given adequate reasons to the Russian people. Officially, this case was never explained either.

I was told, however, that they were removed because of antiparty tendencies, having tried to form an anti-Moscow faction. The story was that they had kept themselves in power by unlawful means. The excuse for final direct action was an election, in which they reported to the Central Committee that they had been reelected unanimously, but a number of people reported to the committee that they had voted against them.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Klimov.

(Following is a biographical sketch on Mr. Klimov:)

Grigoriy Petrovich Klimov, born September 26, 1918, in Novocherkassk in northern Caucasus. From 1926 to 1936 studied in 10-year school from which he was graduated. From 1936 to 1941 studied in Industrial Institute of Ordzhonikidze, graduating in 1941 with a diploma in electrical engineering. From 1941 to 1943 worked as engineer-constructor in plant No. 545 in Gor'kly. In 1943 mobilized in Red army and fought in Leningrad sector of front, where he was wounded. Upon leaving hospital sent to Special Reserve Officer Regiment No. 96 (OPROS 96). In summer of 1944 assigned to Red Army Military Institute of Foreign Languages, where he was admitted to the last grade of the German faculty because of his knowledge of German. On graduation from the institute in June 1945 was sent to main headquarters of Soviet occupation troops in Germany, SVAG in Berlin-Karlhorst. From June 1945 to February 1946 was economic adviser of General Shabalin, chief of economic administration in SVAG. Following reorganization of the economic administration in February 1946, was transferred to the industrial administration of SVAG, headed by A. Alekzandrov, where he was chief engineer for electrical industry until February 1947. Was demobilized and sent back to Ministry of Electrical Industry in Moscow because he was not a member of the Communist Party, thus was deemed politically unreliable. In February 1947 crossed border into American Zone of Germany where, after being checked, he was granted political asylum. Became writer and journalist. In 1952 started publishing magazine Svoboda (Freedom) in Germany in cooperation with a group of postwar emigres from U. S. S. R. In 1952 organized Central Union of Postwar Emigres from the U. S. S. R., carrying on active anti-Communist propaganda work beyond Iron Curtain.

TESTIMONY OF GRIGORIY PETROVICH KLIMOV

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Klimov, you have been a military man, have you not?

Mr. KLIMOV. I was Chief Engineer in the Soviet Military Administration, Civilian Personnel.

Mr. MORRIS. And as such were you able to know something about Mr. Zhukov and Mr. Bulganin?

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Mr. KLIMOV. I know, in some way, only Zhukov. Or it would be better if I said I was a good friend of him. It is impossible to know his thoughts and his policies. He was just Military Governor at that time, and I was engineer at the headquarters.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what do you think is the meaning of the apparently stronger position of Bulganin and Zhukov? What does that mean to you, Mr. Klimov, knowing as you do Mr. Zhukov? Did you know Mr. Bulganin at all?

Mr. KLIMOV. No; I didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, on the basis of your knowledge of them, what does that mean to you?

Mr. KLIMOV. I am sorry, but I wouldn't agree with the previous witness.

For me, the importance of recent changes in the Kremlin is only one point. That's the consolidation of power in one person. We could think maybe Malenkov is better and Khrushchev is worse; this person is maybe better; the other is worse, and the policy of one will be different than the other in some way.

I think that it depends not on personalities, the Soviet policy, internal and external; it depends not on personalities. It depends on the system itself.

The so-called liberalization of the Soviet system now is only the result of the process—we can't call this process—collective dictatorship. That's the process of stabilization and concentration of power in one hand.

As soon as this power is concentrated in one hand, will it be Khrushchev, as it is now, or maybe somebody else?

The Soviet policy will be exactly the same as it was under Stalin.

I think that all these persons or personalities—they are, we can say, slaves of the Soviet system, which implies its own laws and restrictions.

Mr. Chairman, if you would be in Khrushchev's place—I am sure you have wonderful moral characteristics. You are a Democrat. But if you would sit in the chair of Mr. Khrushchev, you would have to do exactly the same what Khrushchev is doing. It is the person making the policy there, but the system which imposes its own strict rules—the strategic ideology and the strategic system.

Sometimes we guess here, I think, that the Soviet system could change according to some changes in their leadership. I think there will be no changes.

Senator HRSUSKA. Well, now, would you say that there will be no change, not, of course, in their goals or their objectives, but might there not be some change in some of the means by which they currently move toward those objectives, whether it is in foreign policy or whether it is in internal policy?

Mr. KLIMOV. I think it will be exactly the same as soon as the power is concentrated in one hand. The years after the death of Stalin represent only the process of concentration of power. We have Malenkov. After that we have Khrushchev and the recent changes. All this process is only concentration of dictatorship.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, now, Mr. Klimov, we heard a great deal recently that after the death of Stalin the West could take new hope in the fact that the Soviet had not a one-man dictatorship but a collective dictatorship.

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Mr. KLIMOV. Yes. And now there is more power in the hands of Khrushchev than before. He ousted his competitors, and now he's a more personal dictator than before.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think that this is the end of the collective dictatorship and it will go back to one-man dictatorship?

Mr. KLIMOV. Now we're nearer to the personal dictatorship than before.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you will tell us about the military here, because you are a military man. What is the relative role of Zhukov and Bulganin now?

Mr. KLIMOV. Now Zhukov is the second man after Khrushchev.

Mr. MORRIS. And Bulganin?

Mr. KLIMOV. Bulganin, he is a lieutenant. But I don't think Bulganin has ambitions to be the first man. And perhaps Zhukov doesn't have such ambitions either.

Mr. MORRIS. What kind of a man is Zhukov? You said you knew Zhukov, you worked under him. What kind of a man is he? Can you tell us anything about him?

Mr. KLIMOV. I don't know him so well that I could tell about his political opinions.

Mr. MORRIS. You what?

Mr. KLIMOV. I don't know Zhukov so well that I could know his political opinions.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what do you think these changes portend in the future?

Mr. KLIMOV. The chief meaning of this change is that Khrushchev is now, we can say, more established as a personal dictator, and he will feel himself much more sure than before.

Before the changes, there were differences in opinions between these two groups, and now the power is more consolidated and the Presidium of the party is more united behind Khrushchev. Therefore, the power of Khrushchev will be more assured than before.

Senator HRUSKA. Anything further, Judge Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. I have nothing further, Senator, unless you think that we should ask Mr. Bialer, who had not finished, a few more questions.

Senator HRUSKA. If you have any further questions to ask of him, we can recall him.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Klimov.

Senator Hruska. Thank you for appearing.

FURTHER TESTIMONY OF SEWERYN BIALER, ACCOMPANIED BY
INTERPRETER JAN KARSKI

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bialer, there is one other thing we would like to cover with you.

Do you think that, as Mr. Ege estimated, the people who had been close to Stalin will in the future be eliminated; that is, eliminated from power?

Now, may I just ask you one thing. What do you think will happen to Malenkov? Malenkov was a technician, was he not, and he had many technicians following him?

Mr. BIALER. Malenkov was not a technician. He was a party man. He was a secretary of the party. But his policy, his political concep-

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tion, was blended with the technicians groups, the bureaucratic groups in Russia.

Senator Hruska. But he himself was not a technician?

Mr. BIALER. No; he was a party man. He was a professional party man, we can see.

Senator Hruska. What is there in store for him in the future? What will happen to him?

Mr. BIALER. It's very—it's not easy to tell what will happen. From my point of view, I agree fully with Mr. Ege. I don't think it will be in the future, in the immediate future. For one thing, I don't think there will be purges in 1957, where a thousand men are destroyed or liquidated.

I think that Khrushchev don't want such kind of purges. He don't want them, first from the point of the relations with the other Communist countries. He don't want it from the point of internal relations of the Soviet people. He himself denounced Stalin's crimes, and, in such a short time after he denounced them at the party conference, he cannot alone be responsible for such crimes.

From this point of view, he will want the present purge to go in other ways than the Stalin purge. He will not want the people to think that what he does now is the same thing that Stalin had done with Bukharin.

From this point of view, Khrushchev may be forced to order a purge in 1957. He may be forced if the people he dismissed fight against him. I think that if he is not forced, he will not liquidate Malenkov, he will not liquidate Molotov, and he will not liquidate Kaganovich.

He will liquidate Molotov as a political leader, as a political man. He will not liquidate him as a human being.

I agree with Mr. Ege on another point. I think that now we are coming to this same kind of a purge against the lower echelon. The low men, like Molotov and Kaganovich, men from the lower echelons, will be removed from their posts, but without liquidations. We cannot tell now about these conceptions of Khrushchev. He will be lucky in this respect: he will know how to do it.

Maybe he will be forced, but I think that he don't want to be forced to liquidate these people.

Senator Hruska. Do you think the popular feeling in the country is supporting Khrushchev now in his present position?

Mr. BIALER. I think here are really 2 questions in this 1 question of yours. The people in Russia, I think, fear a new Stalin. They fear that Khrushchev will be a new Stalin, that the Soviet will return to the old years of Stalinist terror. And, from this point of view, I don't think that the people in Russia are very happy with what has happened. And I think that the people in Russia are afraid. They don't know whether to be happy or not to be happy.

From the other point of view, when we speak about the satellite countries—I know better the people in satellite countries. For example, in Poland. I think in Poland, for example, the people are happy about certain things, because Molotov was a strong man in the old Politburo and he was strongly opposed to the bloodless revolution in Poland. From this point of view, the old followers of the old Stalinist policy in the Polish party, for example—yes, all Stalin's followers—

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The INTERPRETER. They are weakened completely in Poland.
Mr. BIALER. And Gomulka can fight against Stalinists in Poland—

The INTERPRETER. Gomulka will have an argument in Poland that what he is doing in Poland is the same that Khrushchev did in the Soviet Union.

Mr. BIALER. From this point of view, his position will be strengthened and his position will be more stabilized than before.

Senator HRUSKA. What about the relations with Tito?

Mr. BIALER. I think what I say about Gomulka, is the same with Tito.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, is this the end of the so-called collective dictatorship?

Mr. BIALER. It's not easy to tell. I don't think that Khrushchev, up to now, has such a power as Stalin had. Stalin was independent of anybody. He was really independent. And one thing more. Stalin had his secret police, and we can see now the power of the secret police is less. The secret police was liquidated as a political power in the Soviet Union. This is political power in the Soviet Union now, not police power. From this point of view, I don't think Khrushchev now is in such a position as was Stalin in his dictatorship. But Khrushchev is going up; his power is going up. The direction of the development is in such direction that his power is going up. He has, every month, in his hands more power.

I don't think that we have now a 1-leader dictatorship such as in Stalin's time. We have not now such a collective leadership as we had 2 years ago. We have a transitional period now, and we cannot tell what will come out of the transitional period. It depends on circumstances.

Senator HRUSKA. Now, you spoke about the satellites. Would you have any comments on the current visit in Czechoslovakia? What meaning has that? There seem to have been certain leaders at the airport to greet the Soviet visitors. Certain others were not there. And there was some talk about a turnover in the leadership.

Mr. BIALER. I want to give one example from my point of view. This is a very interesting example about Rumania.

Mr. MORRIS. What about?

Mr. BIALER. Rumania. You see, all the leaders—the first secretaries of the party, in Rumania, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia—are all Stalinist men. They moved to Rumania, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia 10 years ago, and they rule now. They have organized the purges, Stalinist purges, in 1952, 1951, against Slansky in Czechoslovakia, for example. And in Rumania there was recently a very interesting development. I think it is very characteristic for the three countries, for Rumania, Czechoslovakia, East Germany. The first secretary of the party, George Dej, removed from the Politburo two members, Kishiniewski, and I have forgotten the second name.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that?

Mr. BIALER. Kishiniewski.

The INTERPRETER. K-i-s-h-i-n-i-e-w-s-k-i.

Mr. BIALER. Constantinescu was the first. And they denounced Ana Pauker, the woman who was a member of the Politburo in 1953, declaring that she organized purges in 1951 and 1952; that she wanted

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power for herself. And what is the meaning of this? Ana Pauker died, I think. Or Ana Pauker was removed from her post when Stalin was alive in 1952. And George Dej, he was first secretary of the Rumanian party. He wants to put the blame for the whole Stalinist problem on the woman whom he'd dismissed from the party when Stalin was alive. He want—George Dej—

The INTERPRETER. George Dej wants to defend himself in such a way as to put the blame on somebody who is no more alive; on a dead woman.

Mr. BIALER. George Dej understands that, after Molotov's and Kaganovich's dismissal in Moscow, he must do something. He must have all Stalinists removed, because, if he don't remove them, it will be held against him since his is also a Stalinist. And I think this is the tactic of the Rumanian, East German, Czechoslovakian parties; to put the blame on little men, to put the blame on men who were long ago removed and thus to defend themselves from such new purges as in Russia, against Molotov and Kaganovich.

Mr. MORRIS. And that situation prevails, too, in Czechoslovakia?

Mr. BIALER. In Czechoslovakia, we don't see new movements now. But I think that what was in Rumania will be typical for East Germany and for Czechoslovakia.

Senator HRUSKA. Is that all, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Senator HRUSKA. Mr. Ege, would you have any further comments? We kind of cut you off short.

FURTHER TESTIMONY OF WITNESS EGE

Mr. EGE. I have one comment.

Mr. Chairman, I think there is one very instructive point in this breakup, and I would like that to go into the record.

The Soviet press, for years, boasted that, in the West there are reactionaries, warmongers, and so on; that the West, especially the United States of America, is organizer of what is commonly called the third world war.

Now we had the pleasure of hearing from Malenkov, Khrushchev that they had their own reactionaries and warmongers.

On the question of foreign policy, it was formulated and written on paper that Molotov, Mikoyan, and Malenkov were that group which opposed lessening the world tensions and were trying to create new world tensions and war. That indicates that, within the presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and that means within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, there was a large group of people who wanted reaction, war, and new catastrophe.

I would like that to go in the record.

Senator HRUSKA. Thank you, Mr. Ege.

Mr. MORRIS. Anything more, Mr. Klimov?

FURTHER TESTIMONY OF WITNESS KLIMOV

Mr. KLIMOV. I'd like only to make it short.

The shifting of persons in the top echelons in Soviet Union will change nothing, because here in the West there can be only guessing in connection with these changes. All of us hope that maybe somebody

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who will come to the leadership will be better than Molotov, Kagannovich, Khrushchev, or Stalin.

My point, which I would underline here and emphasize: So long as the system itself isn't changing, there will be no changes no matter who will be the leader. As long as, or as soon as there will be personal dictatorship, which is practically now underway, we will have the same troubles with all the Soviet system as we had before.

Senator Hruska. Thank you very much.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me, Senator, I would like to put into the record in connection with the spy case the statement of Congressman Walter, who put many facts about the Communist activities in the United States of the Zlatovskis in the record, and I think it is important.

Senator Hruska. It will be placed in the record in the appropriate place.

(The statement of Congressman Walter was marked "Exhibit No. 486" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 486

[From the Congressional Record, July 10, p. 10132]

STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE FRANCIS E. WALTER ON TWO EX-UNITED STATES AIDS INDICTED AS SPIES BY A FEDERAL GRAND JURY IN NEW YORK

(Mr. WALTER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Speaker, the July 9 newspapers throughout the United States carry the story of the actions by a Federal grand jury in returning espionage indictments against additional American citizens.

Those recently indicted are Jane Foster Zlatovski, who was born in San Francisco, Calif., on June 29, 1912, and George Michael Zlatovski, her husband, a naturalized American, born in Russia.

The indictment charged that since 1940, the Zlatovskis conspired with Russians in New York, Washington, Paris, Austria, and Switzerland to obtain United States defense data of interest to the Soviet Union. They were accused of stealing documents and photographs and with having turned over commercial, industrial, and political information, as well as information respecting the military with whom they were directly employed.

Jane Foster Zlatovski was issued a passport on March 13, 1947, which was renewed on March 18, 1949, at Paris, France. A new passport was issued at Paris, France, April 9, 1951. This passport was renewed on April 20, 1953. On December 3, 1954, her passport was taken up and withdrawn by the Department of State. The passport expired on April 20, 1955. She sought return of her passport, and on January 19, 1955, she received an informal hearing. In this connection she executed an affidavit which denied that she was then or had ever been a member of the Communist Party, the Communist Political Association, the Young Communist League, or, to her knowledge, any other Communist organization. However, she admitted that during a brief period commencing in May 1941, and terminating in January 1942, she "embraced what I then conceived the Communist ideology with enthusiasm, attended all manner of meetings, particularly because my own abhorrence of war coincided with the then expressed views of those espousing the Communist cause."

Jane Zlatovski thereafter was accorded all of the procedures of appeal, including a hearing before the Board of Passport Appeals. On March 29, 1955, the Board of Passport Appeals recommended that a passport be denied to her. On March 30, 1955, the Secretary of State approved the recommendations of the Board of Passport Appeals and her application for a passport was disapproved.

The Passport Division, the Board of Passport Appeals, and the Secretary of State acted upon confidential information which had been received from agencies of the United States Government and mainly from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This information, which was subsequently made public, was that Jane Zlatovski had attended Communist Party meetings in San Francisco in 1934 and 1935; that in June 1941 she picketed the White House for the American Peace Mobilization, an organization cited by the Attorney General; that she was

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a Communist Party member; that she, in 1942, was reported to be in sympathy with the ideology of the Communist Party and to be a Communist; that she is married to one George Michael Zlatovski, a known Communist, who was born in Russia and who now resides in Paris; that she in 1942, prior to her marriage, lived in New York with people who conducted Communist meetings in their home; that she was associated with or in contact with or affiliated with several organizations, including the International Labor Defense in 1941, the Washington Book Shop in 1943, and the American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born; that she publicly discussed her Communist Party membership in Washington, D. C., in 1942; that she worked for the Communist Party in the Dutch East Indies from 1936 to 1940, and also in San Francisco; that both she and her husband were doing Communist Party work in Europe in 1948 and that while employed by the OSS she gave an interview to the Daily People's World, the official west coast Communist publication, at which time she disclosed her connection with the OSS Java mission, which disclosure amounted to a serious breach of security regulations of the OSS.

Thereafter, Jane Foster Zlatovski filed suit against the Secretary of State in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. This action to force the Secretary of State to issue a passport was assigned to Judge Burnita S. Matthews.

On July 9, 1955, Jane Foster Zlatovski asked the court to issue a preliminary injunction enjoining the Department of State from withholding or denying a passport during the pendency of the suit in order that she might return immediately to her husband in Paris.

On June 28, 1955, Judge Matthews ordered the Secretary of State to grant Mrs. Zlatovski a quasi-judicial hearing. The quasi-judicial hearing had been ruled in earlier decisions against the Secretary of State to be a hearing in which the applicant for a passport was faced by their accusers.

On August 3, 1955, the Secretary of State filed an affidavit in support of the Government's motion for a summary dismissal of the action. The Secretary's affidavit, which included the derogatory information set forth above, concluded, "I have again reviewed the file in the passport case of Mrs. Jane Foster Zlatovski, and based on all of the available information, I have reached the conclusion that it would not be in the interest of the United States to issue a passport to Mrs. Jane Foster Zlatovski to go abroad in that her return to France would be inimical to the security of the United States and to its relations with other countries."

The Secretary of State in reaching these findings had information which directly related to the espionage activities in which Jane Foster Zlatovski was engaged. The indictment of the Sobels and other indictments for espionage, which I am confident will grow out of the grand jury investigation now going on in New York, would have been impossible had the Secretary of State made available to Jane Foster Zlatovski, a member of the espionage organization, the information or a portion of the information which was in the Secretary's possession.

After the affidavit by the Secretary of State was filed, Judge Matthews called into chambers Leonard Boudin, the attorney for Jane Zlatovski, and the attorney for the Secretary of State, and indicated that unless the Department possessed and divulged derogatory information in addition to that set forth above, and in particular derogatory information dated more recently than 1948, she would issue an order directing the issuance of a passport to Jane Foster Zlatovski, who was yesterday indicted for engaging in espionage against the United States.

The Secretary of State was therefore placed by the court in the untenable position of either divulging to a member of an espionage organization, the knowledge which the Secretary possessed of her espionage activities or of giving her a United States passport which would permit here to return to Europe and to engage in espionage in behalf of the Soviets against our free allies.

Mr. Speaker, this situation again points up the necessity for the Congress to assert its prerogatives as the lawmaking body of the National Government. Time and again, in hearings of the Committee on Un-American Activities, as well as hearings of a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, we have seen cases in which the security of this Nation is threatened by loose passport practices which are spear-headed by court decisions such as the decision in the instant case.

I call this to the attention of the House because I expect to press relentlessly for remedial legislation to the end that we may have a sound passport program.

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Mr. MORRIS. One other thing. [Addressing the press table:] Are you a Tass representative?

Mr. KISLOF. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. We have a new Tass representative. I do not think I have seen this man.

Could you identify yourself for the record?

Mr. KISLOF. Alexander Kislof, K-i-s-l-o-f.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Mr. Paramanov still over here?

Mr. KISLOF. Yes.

Senator HRUSKA. Does that conclude the hearing?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Senator HRUSKA. The subcommittee wants to thank the witnesses for coming and contributing to the record of the committee.

The meeting is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 11:10 a. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.)

(The New York Federal grand jury indictment of Rudolph Ivanovich Abel was later ordered into the record and reads as follows:)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

United States of America v. Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, also known as Mark and also known as Martin Collins and Emil R. Goldfus, Defendant

No. —

The Grand Jury charges:

COUNT ONE

1. That from in or about 1948 and continuously thereafter up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, in the Eastern District of New York, in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and elsewhere, Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, also known as "Mark" and also known as Martin Collins and Emil R. Goldfus, the defendant herein, unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly did conspire and agree with Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic", Mikhail Svirin, Vitali G. Pavlov, and Aleksandr Mikhailovich Korotkov, coconspirators but not defendants herein, and with divers other persons to the Grand Jury unknown, to violate Subsection (a) of Section 794, Title 18, United States Code, in that they did unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly conspire and agree to communicate, deliver, and transmit to a foreign Government, to wit, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and representatives and agents thereof, directly and indirectly, documents, writings, photographs, photographic negatives, plans, maps, models, notes, instruments, appliances, and information relating to the national defense of the United States of America, and particularly information relating to arms, equipment and disposition of United States Armed Forces, and information relating to the atomic energy program of the United States, with intent and reason to believe that the said documents, writings, photographs, photographic negatives, plans, maps, models, notes, instruments, appliances, and information would be used to the advantage of a foreign nation, to wit, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

2. It was a part of said conspiracy that the defendant and his coconspirators would collect and obtain, and attempt to collect and obtain and would aid and induce divers other persons to the Grand Jury unknown, to collect and obtain information relating to the national defense of the United States of America, with intent and reason to believe that the said information would be used to the advantage of the said foreign nation, to wit, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

3. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and certain of the coconspirators, including Aleksandr Mikhailovich Korotkov and Mikhail Svirin, being representatives, agents, and employees of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, would by personal contact, communications and other means to the Grand Jury unknown, both directly and indirectly, employ, supervise, pay, and

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maintain the defendant and other coconspirators for the purpose of communicating, delivering, and transmitting information relating to the national defense of the United States to the said Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

4. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the defendant and certain of his coconspirators would activate and attempt to activate as agents within the United States certain members of the United States Armed Forces who were in a position to acquire information relating to the national defense of the United States, and would communicate, deliver, and transmit, and would aid and induce each other and divers other persons to the Grand Jury unknown, to communicate, deliver, and transmit information relating to the national defense of the United States to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

5. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the defendant and certain of his coconspirators would use short-wave radios to receive instructions issued by said Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to send information to the said Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

6. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the defendant and certain of his coconspirators would fashion "containers" from bolts, nails, coins, batteries, pencils, cuff links, earrings and the like, by hollowing out concealed chambers in such devices suitable to secrete therein microfilm, microdot, and other secret messages.

7. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the said defendant and his coconspirators would communicate with each other by enclosing messages in said "containers" and depositing said "containers" in prearranged "drop" points in Prospect Park in Brooklyn, New York, in Fort Tryon Park in New York City, and at other places in the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere.

8. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the said defendant and certain of his coconspirators would receive from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its agents, officers, and employees large sums of money with which to carry on their illegal activities within the United States, some of which money would thereupon be stored for future use by burying it in the ground in certain places in the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere.

9. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the defendant and certain of his coconspirators, including Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," would assume, on instruction of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the identities of certain United States citizens, both living and deceased, and would use birth certificates and passports in the name of such United States citizens, and would communicate with each other and other agents, officers, and employees of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics through the use of numerical and other types of secret codes, and would adopt other and further means to conceal the existence and purpose of said conspiracy.

10. It was further a part of said conspiracy that defendant and certain of his coconspirators would, in the event of war between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, set up clandestine radio transmitting and receiving posts for the purpose of continuing to furnish the said Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with information relating to the national defense of the United States, and would engage in acts of sabotage against the United States.

In pursuance and furtherance of said conspiracy and to effect the object thereof, the defendant and his coconspirators did commit, among others, in the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere, the following:

OVERT ACTS

1. In or about the year 1948 Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, also known as "Mark" and also known as Emil R. Goldfus and Martin Collins, the defendant herein, did enter the United States at an unknown point along the Canadian-United States border.

2. In or about the summer of 1952, at the headquarters of the Committee of Information (known as the KI) in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," a coconspirator herein, did meet with Vitali G. Pavlov, a coconspirator herein.

3. In or about the summer of 1952, at the headquarters of the Committee of Information (known as the KI) in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," a coconspirator herein, did meet with Mikhail Svirin, a coconspirator herein.

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4. On or about October 21, 1952, in New York City, Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," a coconspirator herein, did disembark from the liner "Queen Mary."

5. In or about October 1952, Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," a coconspirator herein, did go to Central Park in Manhattan, New York City, and did leave a signal in the vicinity of the restaurant known as the Tavern-on-the-Green.

6. In or about 1952, Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," a coconspirator herein, did go to the vicinity of Prospect Park in Brooklyn within the Eastern District of New York.

7. In or about November 1952, Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," a coconspirator herein, did go to Fort Tryon Park in New York City and did leave a message.

8. In or about December 1952, Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," a coconspirator herein, did meet and confer with Mikhail Svirin, a coconspirator herein, in the vicinity of Prospect Park in Brooklyn within the Eastern District of New York.

9. In or about the summer of 1953, Mikhail Svirin, a coconspirator herein, did meet and confer with Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," a coconspirator herein, in the vicinity of Prospect Park in Brooklyn, within the Eastern District of New York, and did give to Hayhanen a package of soft film.

10. On or about December 17, 1953, the defendant, Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, also known as "Mark" and also known as Emil R. Goldfus and Martin Collins, did rent a studio consisting of one room on the fifth floor of the building located at 252 Fulton Street, Brooklyn, within the Eastern District of New York.

11. In or about August or September 1954, the defendant, Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, also known as "Mark" and also known as Emil R. Goldfus and Martin Collins, did meet with Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," a coconspirator herein, in the vicinity of the Keith's RKO Theater, Flushing, Long Island, within the Eastern District of New York.

12. In or about the summer of 1954, the defendant, Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, also known as "Mark" and also known as Emil R. Goldfus and Martin Collins, and Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," a coconspirator herein, did go by automobile to the vicinity of New Hyde Park, Long Island, within the Eastern District of New York.

13. In or about March or April 1955, the defendant, Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, also known as "Mark" and also known as Emil R. Goldfus and Martin Collins, and Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," a coconspirator herein, did proceed by automobile from New York City to Atlantic City, New Jersey.

14. In or about the spring of 1955, Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," a coconspirator herein, did proceed by automobile from New York City to the vicinity of Quincy, Massachusetts, at the direction of defendant Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, also known as "Mark" and also known as Emil R. Goldfus and Martin Collins.

15. In or about December 1954 or January 1955, Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," a coconspirator herein, did proceed by rail transportation from New York to Salida, Colorado, at the direction of the defendant Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, also known as "Mark" and also known as Emil R. Goldfus and Martin Collins.

16. In or about the spring of 1955, the defendant, Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, also known as "Mark" and also known as Emil R. Goldfus and Martin Collins, and Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," a coconspirator herein, did proceed from New York City to the vicinity of Poughkeepsie, New York, for the purpose of locating a suitable site for a shortwave radio.

17. In or about the spring of 1955, the defendant, Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, also known as "Mark" and also known as Emil R. Goldfus and Martin Collins, in the vicinity of 252 Fulton Street, Brooklyn, New York, within the Eastern District of New York, did give a shortwave radio to Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," a coconspirator herein.

18. In or about 1955, the defendant, Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, also known as "Mark" and also known as Emil R. Goldfus and Martin Collins, did bring a coded message to Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," a coconspirator herein, and did request him to decipher said message.

19. In or about February 1957, the defendant, Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, also known as "Mark," and also known as Emil R. Goldfus and Martin Collins, did meet and confer with Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," a coconspirator herein, in the vicinity of Prospect Park, Brooklyn, within the Eastern District of New York, and did then and there give to Hayhanen a birth certificate and two hundred dollars in United States currency.

(In violation of 18 U. S. C. 794 (c).)

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COUNT TWO

The Grand Jury further charges:

1. That from in or about 1948 and continuously thereafter and up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, in the Eastern District of New York, in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and elsewhere, Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, also known as "Mark," and also known as Martin Collins and Emil R. Goldfus, the defendant herein, unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly did conspire and agree with Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic"; Mikhail Svirin; Vitali G. Pavlov; and Aleksandr Mikhailovich Korotkov, coconspirators but not defendants herein, and with divers other persons to the Grand Jury unknown, to violate Subsection (c) of Section 793, Title 18, United States Code, in the manner and by the means hereinafter set forth.

2. It was a part of said conspiracy that the defendant and his coconspirators would, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense of the United States of America, receive and obtain and attempt to receive and obtain documents, writings, photographs, photographic negatives, plans, maps, models, instruments, appliances, and notes, of things connected with the national defense of the United States, knowing and having reason to believe at the time of said agreement to receive and obtain said documents, writing, photographs, photographic negatives, plans, maps, models, instruments, appliances, and notes of things connected with the national defense, that said material would be obtained, taken, made, and disposed of contrary to the provisions of Chapter 37, Title 18, United States Code, in that they would be delivered and transmitted, directly and indirectly, to a foreign Government, to wit, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and to representatives, officers, agents, and employees of the said Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the said defendant, intending and having reason to believe that the said documents, writings, photographs, photographic negatives, plans, maps, models, instruments, appliances, and notes of things relating to the national defense of the United States of America would be used to the advantage of a foreign nation, to wit, the said Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

3. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the said defendant and his coconspirators would make contact with persons to the Grand Jury unknown, who were resident in the United States, and at places to the Grand Jury unknown, and who, by reason of their employment, position, or otherwise, were acquainted and familiar with and were in possession of or had access to information relating to the national defense of the United States of America.

4. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the defendant and certain of his coconspirators would activate and attempt to activate as agents within the United States certain members of the United States Armed Forces who were in a position to acquire information relating to the national defense of the United States, and would communicate, deliver, and transmit, and would aid and induce each other and divers other persons to the Grand Jury unknown to communicate, deliver, and transmit information relating to the national defense of the United States to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

5. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the defendant and certain of his coconspirators would use shortwave radios to receive instructions issued by said Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to send information to the said Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

6. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the defendant and certain of his coconspirators would fashion "containers" from bolts, nails, coins, batteries, pencils, cuff links, earrings, and the like, by hollowing out concealed chambers in such devices suitable to secrete therein microfilm, microdot, and other secret messages.

7. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the said defendant and his coconspirators would communicate with each other by enclosing messages in said "containers" and depositing said "containers" in prearranged "drop" points in Prospect Park in Brooklyn, New York, in Fort Tryon Park in New York City, and at other places in the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere.

8. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the said defendant and certain of his coconspirators would receive from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its agents, officers, and employees large sums of money with which to carry on their illegal activities within the United States, some of which money would thereupon be stored for future use by burying it in the ground in certain places in the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere.

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9. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the defendant and certain of his coconspirators, including Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," would assume, on instruction of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the identities of certain United States citizens, both living and deceased, and would use birth certificates and passports in the name of such United States citizens, and would communicate with each other and other agents, officers, and employees of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics through the use of numerical and other types of secret codes, and would adopt other and further means to conceal the existence of said conspiracy.

10. It was further a part of said conspiracy that defendant and certain of his coconspirators would, in the event of war between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, set up clandestine radio transmitting and receiving posts for the purpose of continuing to furnish the said Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with information relating to the national defense of the United States, and would engage in acts of sabotage against the United States.

OVERT ACTS

In pursuance and furtherance of said conspiracy and to effect the object thereof, the defendant and his coconspirators did commit, among others, within the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere, the overt acts as alleged and set forth under Count One of this indictment, all of which overt acts are hereby realleged by the Grand Jury.

(Section 793, Title 18, United States Code.)

COUNT THREE

The Grand Jury further charges:

1. That throughout the entire period from in or about 1948 and up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, through its representatives, agents, and employees, maintained within the United States and other parts of the world, a system and organization for the purpose of obtaining, collecting, and receiving information and material from the United States of a military, commercial, industrial, and political nature, and in connection therewith, recruited, induced, engaged, and maintained the defendant and coconspirators hereinafter named and divers other persons to the Grand Jury unknown, as agents, representatives and employees to obtain, collect, and receive such information and material for the said Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

2. That from in or about 1948 and continuously thereafter up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment in the Eastern District of New York; in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and elsewhere, Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, also known as "Mark" and also known as Martin Collins and Emil R. Goldfus, the defendant herein, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly did conspire and agree with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and with agents, officers, and employees of the said Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, including Aleksandr Mikhailovich Korotkov, Vitali G. Pavlov, Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," coconspirators but not defendants herein, and with divers other persons to the Grand Jury unknown, to commit an offense against the United States of America, to wit, to violate Section 951, Title 18, United States Code, in the manner and by the means hereinafter set forth.

3. It was a part of said conspiracy that the defendant and Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," and other coconspirators to the Grand Jury unknown, none of whom were included among the accredited diplomatic or consular officers or attachés of the said Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or of any foreign government, would, within the United States, and without prior notification to the Secretary of State, act as agents of the said Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and would, as such agents, obtain, collect, and receive information and material of a military, industrial, and political nature, and as such agents would communicate and deliver said information and material to other coconspirators for transmission to the said Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It was also a part of the said conspiracy that coconspirators residing outside the United States would direct, aid, and assist the defendant and certain coconspirators as aforesaid to act as such agents within the United States and would receive and transmit the said information and material to the said Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

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4. It was further a part of the said conspiracy that the said Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its officers, agents, and employees would employ, supervise, and maintain the defendant and Reino Hayhanen, also known as "Vic," within the United States as such agents of the said Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the purpose of obtaining, collecting, receiving, transmitting, and communicating information and material of a military, commercial, industrial, and political nature.

5. It was further a part of the said conspiracy that the defendant and certain of his coconspirators would receive sums of money and other valuable considerations from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, its officers, agents, and employees, in return for acting as said agents of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics within the United States for the purpose of obtaining, collecting, receiving, transmitting, and communicating information, material, messages, and instructions on behalf and for the use and advantage of the said Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

6. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the said defendant and his coconspirators would use false and fictitious names, coded communications, and would resort to other means to the Grand Jury unknown to conceal the existence and purpose of said conspiracy.

OVERT ACTS

In pursuance and furtherance of said conspiracy and to effect the object thereof, the defendant and his coconspirators did commit, among others, within the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere, the overt acts as alleged and set forth under Count I of this indictment, all of which overt acts are hereby re-alleged by the Grand Jury.

(In violation of Section 371, Title 18, United States Code.)

_____, *Foreman.*
WILLIAM F. TOMPKINS,
Assistant Attorney General.
LEONARD P. MOORE,
United States Attorney.

PART 72

I N D E X

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